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Objectives: The purpose of this study is to analyze the influence of the corporate
governance of pharmaceutical companies on research and development (R&D)
investment.
Methods: The period of the empirical analysis is from 2000 to 2012. Financial
statements and comments in general, and internal transactions were extracted
fromTS-2000of theKoreaListedCompanyAssociation. Samplefirmswere those that
belong to themedical substance and drugmanufacturing industries. Ultimately, 786
firm-year data of 81 firms were included in the sample (unbalanced panel data).
Results:The shareholding ratio of major shareholders and foreigners turned out to
have a statistically significant influence on R&D investment (p < 0.05). No sta-
tistical significance was found in the shareholding ratio of institutional investors
and the ratio of outside directors.
Conclusion: The higher the shareholding ratio of the major shareholders, the
greater the R&D investment. There will be a need to establish (or switch to) a
holding company structure. Holding companies can directly manage R&D in fields
with high initial risks, and they can diversify these risks. The larger the number of
foreign investors, the greater the R&D investment, indicating that foreigners
directly or indirectly impose pressure on a manager to make R&D investments that
bring long-term benefits.1. Introduction
The pharmaceutical industry is expected to achieve a
continuous growth due to an aging population, an
extension of the average lifespan, transformation of the
disease structure to chronic diseases, increased interest
in health and quality of life, and active promotion anduted under the terms of th
.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
ginal author and source are
ase Control and Preventioninvestment by the government and the private sector to
fuel such a high value-added business.
Research and development (R&D) investment has been
relatively insufficient despite constant industry growth,
whereas the percentage of selling, general, and adminis-
trative expenses (SG&A), including sales promotion costs,
has been high. Going forward, government’s reforme Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative
) which permits non-commercial use, distribution, and repro-
credited.
. Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. All rights reserved.
250 M. Leepolicies will kick into high gear in the pharmaceutical
industry. These policies have established in the domestic
market relatively high costs of generic medicines
compared with those of advanced countries and unfair
competition such as negative rebates. It can be said that a
bond of sympathy has developed between the pharma-
ceutical industry and the government around the need to
support R&D investment to promote the industry as a
future growth engine.
Deciding a firm’s R&D investment scale is both a
strategic investment decision related to the firm’s long-
term value creation and an extremely important decision
because it accompanies a certain degree of risk [1]. A
firm’s corporate governance differs according to its
ownership structure, and corporate governance in-
fluences decision making. Therefore, a change in the
ownership structure influences an enterprise value
through discretionary investments such as R&D [2]. A
considerable number of studies analyzed the influence of
ownership structure on a firm’s R&D investment, with a
variety of results. Here, previous studies will be exam-
ined regarding the relationship between R&D invest-
ment and ownership structures such as manager
shareholding ratios, foreigner shareholding ratios, insti-
tutional investor shareholding ratios, and ratios of
outside directors.
The separation between ownership and management
expanded information asymmetry between shareholders
and managers [3,4]. However, if shares are focused
among a minority of shareholders, they tend to have
greater ability to monitor the manager’s decision-
making behavior [1]. Moreover, as they take up a
considerable amount of profits from monitoring and
controlling the manager, they actively participate in the
firm’s decision-making processes to reflect their in-
terests and, in some cases, even collaborate with other
powers to seize the management right from the manager
(or the largest shareholder). The ownership concentra-
tion of shares creates interdependence between share-
holders and the manager, which can reduce information
asymmetry between the manager and major share-
holders [5,6]. This interdependent understanding is a
factor that reduces information asymmetry between the
manager and major shareholders, consequently pro-
moting R&D investment [7]. In an empirical study on
North America, Hansen and Hill [8] reported that there
is a positive relevance between share ownership in-
tensity and R&D investment.
Generally, foreign investors suppress the manager’s
opportunistic actions while also relaxing the manager’s
risk awareness. The fact that quota investment of for-
eigners relaxes the manager’s risk awareness can be
explained with the following elements. First, the man-
ager can use the supplementary knowledge of foreign
investors. As mentioned above, foreigners have a great
deal of professional knowledge about the firms they
invest in [9], and tend to actively share such knowledge[10]. Therefore, the manager can use their knowledge to
reduce the uncertainty of R&D investment. Secondly,
risk awareness can be relaxed by improved trans-
parency. Foreigners have increased motivation to
monitor the manager and tend to have a great moni-
toring ability [11].
One of the recent changes in the capital market is that
the proportion of institutional investors has increased
greatly. Institutional investors receive a mission from
depositors to maximize long-term profits [1,8]. To
accomplish this mission, the firm in which they invest
must have a stable flow of current profits, while also
ensuring future profitability with appropriate long-term
investments such as R&D. Generally, fund managers
who are evaluated quarterly or semiannually for oper-
ating profits cannot wait for investments with a long
gestation period of capital. Therefore, they tend to adjust
the portfolio according to short-term market conditions
rather than investments with high uncertainty and long
gestation periods of capital such as R&D [12]. The other
view regards institutional investors as rational investors.
Because institutional investors have “the economy of
scale” in collecting and evaluating information, they put
more emphasis on long-term value change than
responding to short-term stock price fluctuations [13].
Therefore, institutional investors have the incentive to
promote the firm’s long-term value increase by actively
monitoring the manager’s behavior and participating in
decision making. Hansen and Hill [8] determined that
there is a positive relationship between the shareholding
ratio of institutional investors and R&D investment, and
David et al [1] argued that the role of institutional in-
vestors based on shareholder activism increases R&D
investment for both short- and long-term periods.
Previous studies on the influence of the ratio of
outside directors mostly focused on the replacement of
the top management team and appropriation of wages
that are relatively easy to observe directly; however,
studies on a firm’s strategic decision making such as
their R&D investment are very scarce [14]. A typical
strategic decision of a firm is R&D investment. How-
ever, as mentioned above, shareholders prefer R&D
investment with high profits and high risks, whereas the
manager may be passive regarding R&D investment to
reduce his own employment risk; thus, shareholders and
the manager may have conflicting positions on R&D
investment [15,16]. Therefore, in the legal and institu-
tional view that shareholders’ profits are protected by
securing independence from the board of directors
(BOD), it can be expected that if the BOD comprises
outside directors, it may protect the interests of share-
holders who prefer high-profit and high-risk in-
vestments, thereby increasing R&D investment.
Empirical studies on the relationship between the ratio
of outside directors and R&D investment are very
scarce, and it is impossible to confirm the relationship;
thus, there is a need for additional empirical studies.
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different effects according to situational conditions. In
other words, conflicts of interest may arise if inside in-
vestors, such as managers or controlling shareholders,
expropriate the wealth of outside investors, such as
minority shareholders or creditors, for their personal
gains. Thus, this study analyzes the influence of the
corporate governance of pharmaceutical companies on
R&D investment.Table 1. Annual distribution of sample firms.
Year Firms Share Cumulative
2000 39 4.96 4.96
2001 42 5.34 10.31
2002 48 6.11 16.41
2003 51 6.49 22.90
2004 52 6.62 29.52
2005 56 7.12 36.64
2006 58 7.38 44.02
2007 62 7.89 51.91
2008 68 8.65 60.56
2009 72 9.16 69.72
2010 77 9.80 79.52
2011 80 10.18 89.69
2012 81 10.31 100.002. Materials and methods
2.1. Data sources
The period of the empirical analysis is from 2000 to
2012. The targeted firms for analysis are those listed on
the stock exchange, and they are all of firm level.
Financial statements and comments in general, and in-
ternal transactions were extracted from TS-2000 of the
Korea Listed Company Association. STATA 12.0 was
used as the statistical package for panel analysis. Detailed
reasons for extracting the sample period from among
analysis periods are as follows. Sample firms were those
that belong to the medical substance and drug
manufacturing industries. Cases of complete impairment
of capital in the relevant year and types of management
were excluded, as it may be impossible to compare these
with other firms and years due to high risk of bankruptcy.
The sample firms included firms that closed accounts at
the end of December as well as other settling days,
however, firms that changed the settling days were
excluded as the result might be distorted due to a short
accounting period in the year in which the day was
changed. In analyzing data on R&D investment, there
were issues of omitted records, inconsistency, and failure
of reflected changes in database (DB) of TS-2000 and
KISVALUE-III despite the fact that the accuracy of R&D
cost-related data was extremely important. Thus, this
study collected data from the Data Analysis, Retrieval and
Transfer System of the Financial Supervisory Service.
Ultimately, 786 firm-year data of 81 firms were included
in the sample. Unbalanced panel data with different data
inclusion periods of variables, as shown in Table 1, could
be obtained according to the availability of data.
2.2. Definition and measurement of variables
2.2.1. R&D investment
R&D investment is often used as an index that can
measure the degree of a firm’s pursuit of innovation and
the manager’s pursuit of risk. R&D intensity was used as
a dependent variable to eliminate errors due to relative
difference according to sales of each firm [17].
2.2.2. Major shareholders
A major shareholder refers to the shareholder with
the most shares owned by him or herself as well as his or
her family, relatives, and affiliate persons. Informationon the major shareholder announced in the distribution
of shareholding size in the business report in the relevant
settlement term was used to determine the shareholding
ratio of major shareholders.
2.2.3. Foreign ownership
In the view of the efficient monitoring hypothesis,
institutional and foreign investors are important agents
and external control mechanisms that monitor the
business activities of the management as outside
shareholders, and they influence corporate innovation in
the long-term investment view [18]. Therefore, this
study used the data on the shareholding ratio of for-
eigners of end-of-the-term ordinary shares.
2.2.4. Institutional investors
Outside block shareholders such as institutional in-
vestors manage large funds and have a relatively high
shareholding ratio, thus having the incentive to monitor
corporate management. The shareholding ratio of insti-
tutional investors was calculated as the sum of the
shareholding ratios of institutional investors.
2.2.5. Outside directors
The ratio of outside directors is an index frequently
used in empirical studies on the influence of structural
independence of the BOD on corporate performance,
value, and strategic decisions. The ratio of outside di-
rectors in this study is the value obtained by dividing the
number of outside directors in the BOD by the total
number of registered directors.
2.2.6. Business scale
Business scale is a significant factor that influences
R&D investment. In other words, the bigger the size, the
greater the efficiency of asset utilization [19] as well as
the motivation for risky investments such as R&D [13].
Therefore, the business scale was controlled in this study
[20].
2522.2.7. Firm age
The age of a firm may influence a firm’s strategic
decisions. The longer the term after the firm was
established and listed, the higher the possibility that
investment decisions will be long term. In this study, the
years listed (years passed after the firm was listed) were
controlled instead of the years established.
2.2.8. Size of the BOD
Seen from the agency theory, the strongest system
that can directly control the manager is the system of the
BOD [21,22]. Directors can observe the manager’s ac-
tions and furnish their views by participating in major
business-related, decision-making processes. This result
indicates that the R&D investment may increase with a
greater BOD size. The BOD size was controlled in this
study.
2.2.9. Advertising expense
As a firm spends money on advertising as a means to
promote profit growth, R&D expenditures can also be
seen as an investment to increase profits [23]. Adver-
tising expenses or R&D expenditures can be seen as
investment activities to promote profitability. Therefore,
advertising expense was controlled in this study.
2.2.10. SG&A
SG&A can display the degree of the agency problem,
because wasteful costs, which cannot show the causal
relationship, may be incurred in using corporate re-
sources. Thus, SG&A was controlled in this study.
2.3. Research model
We applied the research model for the empirical
analysis as follows:
Model: Control variables and corporate governance
variablesTable 2. Summary of variables.
Variable
Dependent R&D investment intensity RD (Re
Independent Major shareholders OWN (Or
sh
Foreign ownership FOR (Or

Institutional investors INS (Or
sh
Outside directors ODR (No
Control Business scale SIZE ln (
Firm age YEAR ln (
BOD size BS ln (
Advertising expense AD (Ad
SG&A SAE [(SG
BOD Z board of directors; R&D Z research and development; SG&A Z seRDitZaþ b1OWNit þ b2FORit þ b3INSit þ b4ODRit
þ b5SIZEit þ b6YEARit þ b7BSit þ b8ADit
þ b9SAEit þ miþ 3it
Here, mi is an individual specific effect that is not
observable and not changeable with lapse of time, and
3it is an ordinary error term.
M. Lee3. Results
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of key vari-
ables of all firms used in the empirical analysis. The
characteristics of probability distribution and the outliers
of key variables are as follows. The dependent variable
of R&D investment (RD) appeared to be approximately
6.29%, and the maximum and minimum values show
that there are considerable gaps among firms. The
average of variables related to corporate governance was
the highest for the shareholding ratio of major share-
holders (OWN) with 37.03, whereas the shareholding
ratio of foreigners (FOR) was 5.57, the shareholding
ratio of institutional investors (INS) 1.36, and the ratio
of outside directors (ODR) was 23.36. Firm size and
firm age, which this study considered as control vari-
ables and factors that may influence R&D investment,
turned out not to have a major standard deviation
compared with the average and, therefore, appeared not
to have a significant problem in normal distribution.
Table 4 shows that certain independent variables
were inter-related and related to the dependent variables.
The following correlations among the dependent vari-
ables and between the dependent and independent var-
iables are significant: RD and LIQ (0.232) and SAE
(0.242) are significantly positively correlated; RD and
ROI (0.167), OWN (0.135), INS (0.099), YEAR
(0.210), and AD (0.091) are significantly negatively
correlated.Definition
search costs þ ordinary development costs)/sales  100
dinary shares owned by major shareholders/total ordinary
ares)  100
dinary shares owned by foreigners/total ordinary shares)
100
dinary shares owned by institutional investors/total ordinary
ares)  100
. of outside directors/total no. of registered directors)  100
total assets)
years passed after the firm was listed)
registered directors)
vertising expense/sales)  100
&A e ordinary development costs)/sales]  100
lling, general, and administrative expenses.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
RD 786.00 6.29 9.10 0.12 99.07
SIZE 786.00 7.97 0.43 6.98 9.24
YEAR 786.00 1.02 0.43 0.00 1.71
BS 786.00 0.70 0.15 0.00 1.18
AD 786.00 3.53 3.32 0.00 23.32
SAE 786.00 36.33 14.56 3.26 141.77
OWN 786.00 37.03 14.99 2.31 79.50
FOR 786.00 5.57 10.17 0.00 57.79
INS 786.00 1.36 4.45 0.00 45.05
ODR 786.00 23.36 15.84 0.00 83.33
AD Z advertising expense; BS Z size of board of directors;
FOR Z foreign ownership; INS Z institutional investors;
Max Z maximum; Min Z minimum; Obs Z Observations;
ODR Z outside directors; OWN Z major shareholders;
RDZ research and development investment intensity; SAEZ selling,
general, and administrative expenses; SD Z standard deviation;
SIZE Z business scale; YEAR Z firm age.
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the corporate governance of pharmaceutical companies,
this study conducted a panel analysis of the dependent
variable of R&D investment and independent variables
related to corporate governance, such as the sharehold-
ing ratio of major shareholders, the shareholding ratio of
foreigners, the shareholding ratio of institutional in-
vestors, and the ratio of outside directors (Table 5). In
general, if the shareholding ratio of major shareholders
is high, the manager makes investments with the goal of
increasing long-term enterprise value rather than
obsessing about shortsighted investments by increasing
short-term accounting benefits. Therefore, it is expected
that companies with a high shareholding ratio of major
shareholders will make more R&D investment than
those that do not have a high shareholding ratio of major
shareholders. The shareholding ratio of foreigners has
been found to have a statistically significant influence on
R&D investment. The result was similar to the predic-
tion that a higher shareholding ratio of foreigners willTable 4. Pearson’s correlation coefficients.
RD OWN FOR INS O
RD 1
OWN 0.1354* 1
FOR 0.003 0.0184 1
INS 0.0997* 0.1134* 0.0143 1
ODR 0.0246 0.1056* 0.1301* 0.066 1
SIZE 0.0389 0.2141* 0.4314* 0.0978* 0.4
YEAR 0.2109* 0.2721* 0.2522* 0.1154* 0.3
BS 0.0075 0.0575 0.1943* 0.0979* 0.3
AD 0.0914* 0.1019* 0.0991* 0.1582* 0.0
SAE 0.2426* 0.1339* 0.1069* 0.0447 0.0
*p < 0.1. ADZ advertising expense; BSZ size of board of directors; FORZ f
OWNZmajor shareholders; RDZ research and development investment intens
scale; YEAR Z firm age. p < 0.05. p < 0.01.lead to a greater R&D investment, and that foreign in-
vestors will prefer companies that are actively engaged
in R&D investment. No statistical significance was
found in the shareholding ratio of institutional investors
and the ratio of outside directors.4. Discussion
This study conducted an integrated analysis of the
factors influencing R&D investment in the Korean
pharmaceutical industry, through a detailed review of the
corporate governance in this industry in Korea. TS-2000
was used for the analysis data in this study. The study was
conducted in two phases, targeting the “medical sub-
stance and drug manufacturing industries” between 2000
and 2012. The findings of this study have significant
implications for the flow of investment by pharmaceu-
tical companies into R&D. The author saw corporate
governance as an important factor that influences R&D,
because the agency problem affects R&D investment.
First, it was found in this study that the higher the
shareholding ratio of major shareholders, the greater the
R&D investment. The results of verifying the correla-
tion between corporate governance and R&D invest-
ment showed that the shareholding ratio of major
shareholders, which is a proxy variable of corporate
governance, has a positive influence. Thus, it is neces-
sary to manage the uncertainty and risks of the outcomes
of R&D investment. Moreover, there will be a need to
establish (or switch to) a holding company structure.
Holding companies can directly manage R&D in fields
with high initial risks, and they can diversify these risks.
Further, long-term approaches to R&D investment can
be promoted through such holding companies.
Second, this study showed that the shareholding ratio
of foreigners has a positive relationship with R&D in-
vestment. This result systematically supports the argu-
ment [10,11] that foreigners have an outstanding ability
to monitor and control a manager’s opportunisticDR SIZE YEAR BS AD SAE
349* 1
659* 0.5650* 1
092* 0.4694* 0.3439* 1
279 0.2471* 0.1575* 0.0786* 1
096 0.0728* 0.1075* 0.0034 0.3469* 1
oreign ownership; INSZ institutional investors; ODRZ outside directors;
ity; SAEZ selling, general, and administrative expenses; SIZEZ business
Table 5. Results.
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
SIZE 3.987* 1.165 3.867* 1.181 4.150* 1.204 4.452* 1.166 3.195* 1.223
YEAR 2.049y 0.936 1.493 0.910 1.402 0.913 1.251 0.931 2.142y 0.953
BS 2.417 1.585 1.708 1.582 2.036 1.589 2.013 1.596 2.289 1.594
AD 0.114 0.0822 0.0942 0.0824 0.0925 0.0835 0.101 0.0834 0.0943 0.0835
SAE 0.0351z 0.0197 0.0281 0.0196 0.0254 0.0199 0.0279 0.0322 0.0200
OWN 0.0591* 0.0195 0.0584* 0.0196
FOR 0.0553y 0.0215 0.0542y 0.0216
INS 0.0392 0.0353 0.0125 0.0358
ODR 0.00657 0.0139 0.00535 0.0139
Constant 28.93* 8.732 25.84* 8.911 27.32* 9.183 29.86* 8.838 23.16y 9.248
Adj R2 0.084 0.08 0.073 0.072 0.093
Obs 786 786 786 786 786
ID 81 81 81 81 81
*p < 0.01; yp < 0.05; zp < 0.1. AD Z advertising expense; Adj Z adjusted; BS Z size of board of directors; Coef. Z coefficient; FOR Z foreign
ownership; IDZ Company; INSZ institutional investors; ObsZ Observations; ODRZ outside directors; OWNZ major shareholders; RDZ research
and development investment intensity; SAEZ selling, general, and administrative expenses; SEZ standard error; SIZEZ business scale; YEARZ firm
age.
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the business practices of companies based on their su-
perior business-monitoring techniques. The findings of
this study, which indicate that the higher shareholding
ratio of foreigners leads to greater R&D investment,
indicate that foreigners directly or indirectly impose
pressure on a manager to make investments in R&D that
lead to long-term benefits [24].
Limitations of the present research are described
below. Such limitations should be considered when
understanding and applying the results, and are signifi-
cant in providing a direction for future studies. Mea-
surement error could possibly have been included in the
financial metrics used as a proxy variable of an agency
control device. For example, in the case of a principal
stockholder who performs the role of controlling the
agency costs, the measurement is made by using the
stock holdings of the largest shareholder and an affiliate
person based on the annual reports disclosed by each
firm. It is thus possible that there could be a measure-
ment error due to the data’s credibility, a disguised
dispersion of the holding rate, etc. Therefore, develop-
ment of a proxy variable that can more accurately
measure the agency costs incurred as a result of the
manager’s voluntary decision making would be a future
challenge that needs to be addressed.Conflicts of interest
All contributing authors declare no conflicts of
interest.
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